Exclusive Interview for Argumentum.al with H.E. Mr. Zlatko Kramarić, Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to Albania and Author of “Even After Tito – Tito“
By Marjana Doda
Editor-in-Chief
In an exclusive interview with Argumentum.al, H.E. Mr. Zlatko Kramarić, the Ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to Albania, offers a sobering reflection on the political challenges that continue to shape the Western Balkans today. As the author of the recently published and widely debated book Even After Tito – Tito, Ambassador Kramarić delves into the persistent legacies of authoritarianism that survive long after the collapse of communist regimes and explore how these historical patterns continue to influence the region’s fragile democracies.
Drawing parallels between the Croatian and Albanian experiences, Kramarić emphasizes that the region remains entangled in a political culture where centralized power, the cult of personality, and paternalistic governance prevail beneath a veneer of democratic institutions. “This is not merely a historical analysis,” he explains, “but a reflection on how old authoritarian mentalities adapt and persist in new political forms.” His reflections resonate strongly in Albania, where the shadow of Enver Hoxha’s rigid dictatorship continues to influence political behavior and institutional mistrust.
Beyond the Balkans, Kramarić situates these regional dynamics within global trends of rising populism and hybrid regimes that mimic democracy while eroding its foundations. He warns that the Western Balkans risk becoming a geopolitical flashpoint, with external powers exploiting internal divisions amid weak governance and stalled reforms.
“The new geopolitical era demands new strategies—strategies that can deliver real and lasting stability in the region through concrete actions, not just declarative commitments,” stresses Ambassador Zlatko Kramarić.
As a diplomat representing a country integrated into both the European Union and NATO, Ambassador Kramarić stresses Croatia’s role as a proactive partner in supporting democratic consolidation and regional stability. “Our security and prosperity are interlinked with those of our neighbors,” he asserts, calling for genuine cooperation and support for meaningful reforms rather than superficial gestures.
Despite his critical assessment, Kramarić’s message remains hopeful. He challenges readers and leaders alike to embrace complexity, confront uncomfortable historical truths, and pursue democracy with perseverance and critical thinking. To Albanian readers, Even After Tito – Tito offers not answers but questions—a challenge to rethink power, history, and memory.
“Above all,” he concludes, “I ask for critical thinking, openness to complexity, and the courage to confront uncomfortable truths,” Croatian Ambassador Zlatko Kramarić, author of the book Even After Tito – Tito, shared his insights in the following exclusive interview:
-Marjana Doda: Honorable Ambassador, your recently launched book, Even After Tito – Tito, carries a provocative and enigmatic title. What kind of reflections or discussions are you hoping to inspire among Albanian readers and the wider Balkan audience through this work?
H.E. Mr. Zlatko KRAMARIC: The title “Even After Tito – Tito” is deliberately provocative and layered in meaning – it refers not only to the Yugoslav context but also to the broader post-communist Balkans. I hope that among Albanian readers, as well as those across the region, the book will prompt reflection on why authoritarian models of governance have proven so persistent, even after the fall of communism. The book does not offer definitive answers, but it seeks to create space for critical engagement with political traditions, the culture of power, and democratic shortcomings. In that sense, it acts as a mirror – from a Croatian perspective – that also reflects on Albanian realities.
– You emphasize that the book is not about Tito as a historical figure, but about “Titoism without Tito.” How would you describe today the political legacy of figures like Tito in the post-Yugoslav space and Enver Hoxha in Albania? Can we speak of a “Titoism without Tito” and an “Enverism without Enver”?
It is true that “Even After Tito – Tito” is not a book about Tito as a historical figure, but rather about the enduring patterns of governance and political culture that survived him. I use the phrase “Titoism without Tito” to describe those persistent institutional behaviors and mentalities that outlived the system itself, often devoid of ideological justification.
In this light, one could also speak of “Enverism without Enver” in Albania – not as a continuation of ideology per se, but as the endurance of certain political habits: centralized power, personalized rule, limited space for opposition, and cultural mechanisms of control.
Such reflection does not aim to equate the two regimes, as the historical contexts and degrees of repression differ. Rather, it invites us to ask: how far have the societies in the region truly moved beyond authoritarian models of the past – and how much have those models simply reappeared in new forms?
– Do you believe there exists a political culture in the region that views the leader as irreplaceable? Why is this phenomenon so resistant to democratic change?
Yes, I believe that in this region there still exists a political culture that sees the leader as irreplaceable. This phenomenon has deep roots in the historical experience of our societies, which have long been shaped by authoritarian modes of governance — from monarchies and dictatorships to one-party systems. In such a context, the leader has often been perceived as the “father of the nation,” a guarantor of stability, and the only one capable of “keeping things under control.”
Democratic traditions in this region are like rare plants — fragile, shallow-rooted, and frequently exposed to various forms of erosion, be it through populism, clientelism, or controlled media. In the absence of strong institutions and political accountability, citizens often turn to personalities rather than systems. The leader thus becomes a substitute for trust in the state.
The resilience of this phenomenon to democratic change is partly due to weak civic education, but also to the long-lasting trauma of post-communist transition, during which many citizens lost faith in “Western” democratic models. As a result, the cult of leadership returns — often with new rhetoric, but familiar patterns.
– In your book, you speak about “hybrid regimes” and the repetition of old forms of authoritarianism. Do you think that global developments—such as the rise of populism and authoritarianism—lend legitimacy to similar governments in the region?
In my book, I speak of “hybrid regimes” and the repetition of old authoritarian patterns, because I believe these models—though often dressed in new language—draw their strength from familiar traditions of centralized and personalized power. Unfortunately, global developments—such as the rise of populism, the erosion of liberal-democratic norms, and the normalization of authoritarian practices—lend a certain legitimacy to similar regimes in our region.
Yet this is not merely a “Balkan illness.” Similar tendencies are visible in several EU member states—Poland and Hungary being prominent examples. As the Bulgarian philosopher Ivan Krastev, or authors like Jan-Werner Müller, have long argued, populism is not an aberration, but a symptom of the broader crisis of liberal democracy.
As Krastev and Stephen Holmes pointedly noted, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we did not enter the “end of history” but rather an age of imitation—where democracy is often reduced to a façade, stripped of substance. Within this wider context, our regional hybrid regimes are no exception—they are part of a global pattern in which democracy is increasingly mimicked, but rarely practiced in full.
–How does the Albanian experience of communist isolation and its transition resonate with the themes you explore in your book? Do you see parallels between the Albanian and Croatian realities in terms of authoritarian legacies?
Thank you for this intriguing question. The Albanian experience of communist isolation is indeed extreme—almost unique in the European context. Yet, that very uniqueness can sometimes obscure deeper similarities with other post-communist societies, including Croatia. On the surface, our transitions were quite different: Croatia emerged from communism through war and national mobilisation, while Albania exited from a near-monastic form of dictatorship. But if we strip away those surface differences, striking parallels begin to appear—deep-seated mistrust in institutions, the enduring cult of leadership, the idea that power is inherited or seized, rather than built through dialogue.
In my book, I explore exactly these phenomena—how authoritarian patterns of behaviour and thinking return in new guises, often wrapped in the fine packaging of democratic discourse. In that sense, both “Titoism without Tito” and “Enverism without Enver” continue to live on—in how decisions are made, power is wielded, and silence is cultivated.
So, while our histories, geographies, and anecdotes may differ, in the deeper layers—beyond the rituals—we often meet in the same patterns. Perhaps that is the Balkan paradox: every country is unique, but we all share a curious allergy to genuine democratic roots.
– As a member of both the EU and NATO, what role should Croatia play in promoting democratic stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans?
As a member of both the European Union and NATO, Croatia holds a unique responsibility and opportunity to act as a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the Western Balkans. Rather than adopting a paternalistic stance, Croatia should foster partnerships based on mutual respect, open dialogue, and shared interests.
The stability, democratic consolidation, and institutional functionality of the countries in the region are a strategic priority of Croatian foreign policy. Croatia’s long-term security is inseparably linked to the lasting stability of its neighborhood. This is why Croatia can and should play a proactive role in promoting regional cooperation, dialogue, and reform processes — offering its experience and support, but always in the spirit of partnership.
– At a time when we are witnessing the shaping of a new world order and intensified rivalry between global powers such as the U.S., the EU, Russia, and China, how do you view the position of the Western Balkans? Is the region at risk of becoming a contested sphere of influence? And in this new geopolitical context, do you believe the region’s geostrategic alliances need to be re-evaluated?
As a new global order emerges, shaped by intensifying rivalries among major powers like the US, EU, Russia, and China—the position of the Western Balkans is becoming increasingly complex and fragile. The region is indeed at risk of once again becoming a contested sphere of influence, a geopolitical crossroads where conflicting strategic interests intersect.
What makes the current moment particularly concerning is the rise of unpredictability and irrationality in the decision-making processes of key political and military actors. This introduces significant risks for regions like the Western Balkans, which are burdened by historical tensions and “frozen” conflicts that, under certain pressures, could suddenly reignite and spiral out of control.
Russia’s growing interest in the region is especially notable. In many Western Balkan countries, pro-Russian, anti-European, and anti-NATO political forces remain active and influential, serving as potential instruments of destabilization. Only Albania and Kosovo stand out as consistent advocates of Euro-Atlantic integration.
Given this volatile geopolitical context, it is indeed necessary to critically reassess the strategic alignments of the region—not to distance it from the EU and NATO, but to ensure greater resilience and sovereignty in decision-making, while firmly maintaining a commitment to democratic and European values.
–In an increasingly tense global context, where fragmented wars are shaping a new world order, the Balkans face heightened uncertainties—particularly in Kosovo and Bosnia—under continuous threat from Serbia. What should the Albanian and international actors do to prevent further destabilization in the region?
The Western Balkans, particularly Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, face growing instability and threats, driven mainly by persistent pressure from Serbia. This volatile environment calls for a prompt and decisive response from both domestic and international actors.
Albanian political leaders must demonstrate strategic maturity, coordination, and unwavering commitment to Euro-Atlantic values. At the same time, international actors, especially the European Union, must urgently revise their approach to the region. The old paradigm, which often rewards non-cooperation, ignores European values, and tolerates the balancing act of “sitting on multiple chairs,” is no longer tenable.
It is high time for a new political, security, and economic framework – one that clearly supports those actors and states that consistently uphold democracy, the rule of law, and genuine European integration. Tolerating or appeasing obstructionist behavior only serves to demotivate those committed to moderation, liberal-democratic reforms, and universal values.
The new geopolitical era demands new strategies – ones capable of ensuring real and lasting stability in the region through concrete actions, not just declarative commitments.
-Given global developments such as the rise of authoritarianism, geopolitical tensions, and the reshaping of the world order, how do you view the future of the Balkans in relation to your thesis After Tito – Tito? Is the region doomed to remain trapped by its past, or is there still hope for a stable democratic transition?
In light of current global dynamics – the rise of authoritarianism, geopolitical tensions, and the reshaping of the international order – the future of the Balkans remains uncertain. The central thesis of “Even After Tito – Tito” precisely underscores the persistence of certain political patterns that outlive their originators, reappearing in new and only superficially modernized forms. The Balkans is a region where the past is not truly past, but often functions as a legitimizing framework for present-day politics.
There is a very real danger that the region will remain a hostage to its own history – not only due to political populism and weak institutional culture, but also because of deeply entrenched pre-political models that are frequently cloaked in the language of democracy. It is no coincidence that the book highlights the paradox of Zoran Đinđić’s government – widely seen in the West as a beacon of democratic change in Serbia – which, upon closer scrutiny, did not significantly differ from that of his predecessor. The rhetoric changed, the media presentation was more charismatic and engaging, but the attitudes toward institutions, civil values, the Church, and historical accountability largely remained intact.
This makes it difficult to be simply optimistic – but mere pessimism also falls short. If, as the saying goes, pessimists are simply well-informed optimists, then our task is to remain vigilant and critical, while still refusing to surrender the belief that democracy, stability, and civic peace are not illusions, but rather difficult, demanding, yet possible goals. Hope still exists, but it requires perseverance, clarity, and a willingness to replace myths with reality.
As someone who once rejoiced at the fall of the Berlin Wall and who now often wonders where all that enthusiasm and belief in a “normal life” has gone, I acknowledge the ambivalence. And yet, precisely because of that ambivalence – and in defiance of it – we must continue seeking a better path, both for Croatia and for its neighbours.
–And finally: What do you hope Albanian readers will take away from this book?
This is probably the most difficult question in this interview. An author’s hopes are one thing, but public reception – whether among diplomats, politicians, journalists, academics, or so-called “ordinary” readers – is often something else entirely.
From my readers – just as from my students – I demand, above all, critical thinking, a readiness to embrace complexity, and a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths, regardless of national or ideological sympathies.
What I would like Albanian readers to take from this book is a sense that, beyond its attention to detail and documentation, it strives to preserve a basic sense of objectivity. I have tried to present a balanced approach – without myth-making, without romanticizing history, and without ideological fervor.
I like to describe myself as someone with a sense of proportion – not too much, not too little – but I admit, in some parts of the book I have strayed from that principle and have been highly critical, both of the political actions of Croatian and Yugoslav communists and of nationalists, particularly during the Second World War.
Perhaps the chapter History vs. Memory is one of the most important in the book, as it does not only scrutinize political actors but also intellectuals, especially those who, after 1945, consciously – often out of fear or opportunism – chose silence as a way of life.
Ultimately, I hope that Albanian readers will find in this book an invitation to dialogue, a space for reflection on their own political and social models, and perhaps even a sense that their own histories, dilemmas, and traumas are – if not always explicitly – acknowledged and understood within its pages.
© 2025 Argumentum
