By Philip Acey *

In October 1962, the world was the closest it has ever been to nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was ultimately defused by rational state actors who prioritized the survival of the state above ideology. Cooler heads prevailed in Moscow and Washington. But not in Havana.

In its aftermath, we learned something deeply unsettling: Fidel Castro and Che Guevara were not merely willing to host Soviet nuclear missiles, they were prepared to launch them at the cost of their own country’s total destruction and the potential deaths of not only millions of Americans but of Soviet citizens as well.

“If the nuclear missiles had remained, we would have fired them against the heart of the U.S., including New York City,” Che told British journalist Sam Russell in November 1962, adding, “The victory of socialism is well worth millions of atomic victims.” Fidel Castro echoed that sentiment decades later when speaking with former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara: “Bob, I did recommend they [the nuclear missiles] were to be used.”

Che’s own biographer described how Che had boasted that Cuba was “willing to risk everything in an atomic war of unimaginable destructiveness to defend a principle.” That principle was not peace or survival of Cuba as a state – but the triumph of communism. Fidel and Che were ideologically-driven revolutionaries – men for whom the global advancement of communism justified national suicide.

Fidel and Che were fully aware that a nuclear attack on the United States would mean retaliatory American nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union, resulting in the deaths of countless peaceful Soviet citizens. As President Kennedy warned at the height of the crisis in his October 22, 1962 address: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.”

The Soviet Union, though the leader of the Communist bloc and a revolutionary government itself, remained a rational actor that ultimately prioritized the survival of its state and people over revolutionary idealism. Moscow, in the end, withdrew its missiles from Cuba. The Soviet Union understood that nuclear war must remain unthinkable. In contrast, Che Guevara grew disillusioned with the Soviets’ pragmatism, frequently and openly criticizing them in future years. His frustration eventually led him to leave Cuba in 1965 to pursue armed struggles in Africa, and later in Bolivia, where he was killed.

The world averted nuclear disaster not because of Cuba’s leaders, but in spite of them. The nuclear weapons were never under Havana’s control and nuclear war was only avoided because those weapons remained under the control of the Soviet Union’s pragmatic leadership. Had Cuba possessed operational control over the missiles, the world today might be a very different place. This history offers a warning. Today, the world faces a similarly danger in the Middle East.

Ideology Over State: The Iranian Threat

The Iranian government mirrors much of the ideological fervor seen in revolutionary Cuba. Since seizing power in 1979, Iran’s theocratic leadership has prioritized its revolutionary vision over the well-being of its people or the survival of its state. Crushing dissent, isolating the country, and exporting its Shiite Islamic revolution have been strategic pillars of its foreign policy.

Iran’s clandestine nuclear activities, the IAEA’s verification of its stockpile of 408 kg of 60% enriched uranium (which has no application in a civilian nuclear program), and its often provocative statements regarding Israel and the U.S. reflect a government pursuing nuclear capability not just for defensive deterrence, but as a tool of ideological expansion and leverage.

What makes this pursuit particularly concerning is that Iran’s actions are deeply rooted in its ideological worldview, which fundamentally shapes its strategic calculations. The Iranian government is not just a state – it is an ideology with a state. This distinction sets it apart from most countries, where pragmatism and the preservation of the state take precedence over ideological considerations. The Iranian government is run by a theocratic revolutionary movement of Twelver Shiite Muslims that seized power in 1979. Central to its worldview is the awaited return of the Mahdi, a messianic figure who will wage jihad against enemies in Jerusalem and establish a Shiite-led global government seated in Kufa, Iraq in which all the world’s inhabitants will convert to Shiite Islam.

This ideological mindset raises serious concerns about how Iran might employ nuclear weapons to advance its revolutionary and theocratic objectives. Unlike most other nuclear powers, Iran is unlikely to view its nuclear arsenal as purely a defensive deterrent. Instead, it would likely wield its nuclear capabilities more aggressively, attempting to shift the regional balance of power and expand its ideological influence in the region. The U.S. and Israel are currently capitalizing on the recent regime change in Syria and the weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon to reduce Iran’s influence in the region, while limiting Iran’s ability to export its revolutionary ideals to these countries, which it had been attempting to do for decades. Additionally, both the U.S. and Israel aim to pull Syria and Lebanon into their own sphere of influence.

Why It Matters Now

Unlike nuclear-armed states such as the U.S., Russia, or China, whose leaders ultimately prioritize state preservation, Iran’s revolutionary leadership – like Cuba’s – has demonstrated a willingness to endure economic pain, domestic unrest, and military confrontation to defend and advance its revolutionary mission. Deterrence theory depends on the rationality that the survival of the state is the most important calculus for a government. But such deterrence does not apply to regimes that are willing to die for an ideology at the cost of their state. It did not apply to Cuba in 1962 and it has not applied to Iran since 1979.

A nuclear-armed Iran would not behave like most other nuclear powers, with the exception of North Korea. It would likely use its arsenal to act more boldly in attempting to shift the regional balance of power, emboldening proxies, and intimidating neighboring countries. Iran has long supported militant groups such as Hezbollah and various Shiite militias in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen – many of them designated terrorist organizations by the U.S. and Gulf states. A nuclear-armed Iran would also very likely trigger nuclear proliferation among the Sunni Gulf states, who would feel the need to arm themselves in response, thereby increasing the potential for nuclear conflict and the likelihood of nuclear materials falling into the hands of malign actors in the Middle East.

The prospect of Iran transferring nuclear technology or material to its proxies, whether for profit or ideology, is not hypothetical. North Korea has already demonstrated such behaviour, notably in assisting Syria build a nuclear reactor in al Kibar, which Israel destroyed in an airstrike in 2007. In other cases, North Korean nuclear designs and materials have been found on the black market and in a few select countries secretly developing nuclear weapons programs. Given the ideological and revolutionary nature of its government, its history of supporting militant groups, and its strong ties with North Korea, there’s little reason to believe Iran would behave any differently.

And as Iran’s influence has faced setbacks – due to recent U.S. bombings of its nuclear facilities, the fall of Syria’s Assad regime, and the weakening of its proxies like Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Hamas – it may resort to nuclear weapons as a means of attempting to shift the regional balance more to its favour.

Deterrence Requires Rationality

The foundational assumption behind nuclear deterrence is rationality: that political leaders, whatever their aims, prioritize the survival of their state and the welfare of its people. Revolutionary regimes, however, often place ideology above both.

Cuba’s government proudly displays the slogan “Patria o Muerte, Venceremos” – “Homeland or Death, We will Win.” Its leaders see victory of the revolution, even at the cost of national destruction, as a virtue. This mindset has deeply hindered Cuba’s economic development and contributed to the country’s current severe economic crisis. Above all, however, the country’s leadership continues to spew “defend the revolution at any cost.” Similarly, Iran’s leadership frames its mission as existential, labeling America the “Great Satan” and Israel the “Little Satan,” regularly chanting “Death to America, Death to Israel.”

That’s why the lessons of 1962 matter today. A state that puts ideology above survival is not a responsible nuclear power. A regime that welcomes martyrdom cannot be deterred in a conventional manner. Iran, like revolutionary Cuba, has shown that it does not separate national interest from ideological mission. That is what makes its nuclear ambitions uniquely dangerous.

The Lesson from 1962

Popular culture and socialist movements today too often romanticize and admire figures like Che Guevara and Fidel Castro, who, in the name of advancing an ideology, were willing to destroy not only their own citizens but the future of humanity as well. The lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis is the danger of putting ideological idealism before pragmatism.

In 1962, nuclear war was averted because the weapons remained under the control of a rational, Soviet leadership. Had Cuba possessed operational control over those nuclear missiles, the world might have faced an unthinkable catastrophe.

Today, Iran’s revolutionary government poses a similar threat. Its nuclear ambitions are not just about security, but serve as a tool to advance an uncompromising ideological mission. This makes a nuclear- armed Iran particularly dangerous, underscoring the importance of not only remembering how the Cuban Missile Crisis was resolved, but also recognizing that combining ideological and theocratic revolutionaries with nuclear weapons is a highly volatile mix.

Philip Acey is a PhD candidate from Canada and an independent political researcher and analyst who has worked on the ground for over a decade across Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America, visiting more than 50 countries. His research has been used worldwide to advise the UN Security Council, UN agencies, diplomats, and humanitarian organizations.

*A special thanks to Paul Kengor for already compiling the statements made by Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and President John F. Kennedy in his article: “Averting Nuclear Armageddon — in October 1962 and Today,” EWTN, October 17, 2022, https://ewtn.co.uk/article-averting-nuclear-armageddon-in-october- 1962-and-today/

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