The upcoming elections in Serbia are revealing the Vučić regime’s real fear of losing power. When power feels threatened, weapons, fear, and the external enemy turn into political tools. Serbia is being militarized not because it is under threat, but because it is being used as an instrument of influence by Russia. In this game, peace in the Western Balkans is not being protected, but is being turned into a tool of pressure and geopolitical bargaining.
Author: Dr. Gurakuç Kuçi – Professor at Universum College and external collaborator at the Institute for Hybrid Warfare Studies “OCTOPUS”
Militarization as a false “necessity”
Serbia has begun an accelerated militarization, where according to statements by Aleksandar Vučić, President of Serbia, this state will double its military capacities within a year and a half, creating a sense of urgency among the Serbian people due to strategic encirclement. This militarization becomes even more comprehensive with Serbia’s plans to reinstate compulsory military service and centralize the army.
To legitimize this course, Vucic’s foreign minister, Marko Djuric, has declared that Serbia acts on the principles of “realpolitik,” that is, according to its state interests. In political discourse, this approach relativizes international norms in order to present Serbia’s militarization as a necessary response to an assumed danger. In other words, the invention of the enemy.
To carry out militarization and the total mobilization of society, Serbia has also constructed a justificatory narrative toward international politics and the public. The narrative is consistently built on the military agreement between Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo, elevating this agreement within the framework of propaganda as an alliance against Serbia.
Russian–Serbian synchronization against the Balkans
The acceleration of militarization by Serbia and the construction of the narrative of military encirclement by Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo have diplomatic and practical support from Russia. Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, has stated to the media that they are in talks with Washington about the Balkans, specifically mentioning Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region. At the same time, he has called on Serbia to reconsider its relations with the European Union due to pressure to recognize Kosovo. Yet, simultaneously, he continues to keep alive the narrative that NATO, through its intervention in Yugoslavia, and Kosovo’s independence are violations of international law.
This narrative is continuously reinforced by the spokesperson of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Maria Zakharova, who in her statements repeatedly accuses the authorities in Kosovo of ethnic cleansing against Serbs, an identical claim to that made by Petar Petković, director of the so-called Office for Kosovo and “Metohija,” and Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko, Russia’s ambassador to Serbia, stated a few weeks ago. Likewise, in line with her superior Lavrov, Zakharova continues to insist that NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia and Kosovo’s independence constitute violations of international law.
These positions are not detached from the Kremlin’s political line, but directly reflect statements by Vladimir Putin, who in December 2025 declared that NATO had “destroyed Yugoslavia and the Serbs.”
This diplomatic protection of Serbia by Russia creates a vectorial system of action, in which the global-diplomatic dimension intertwines with the regional-military one. The hardening of this approach has intensified following the adoption of the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which has made clear the strategic importance of the Western Balkans and the limits of geopolitical changes in the region. In this context, Russia and Serbia are acting in sync: either they secure their interests in the Balkans, or they prepare for a broader confrontation in the event of any global escalation, deliberately sidelining the European Union in “bargains.”
Militarization of Serbia ahead of electoral elections
Serbia is expected to hold parliamentary elections in October, November, or December 2026, according to Vucic’s statement. These elections are taking place in a tense political context, following a wave of anti-government protests and documented state violence against protesters, including the use of sonic weapons. This situation has placed the electoral process under the shadow of fear and pressure rather than competition and political freedom.
Vucic has at no point ruled out the possibility of returning to the post of prime minister, using constitutional maneuvers similar to the Putin–Medvedev model. However, in authoritarian regimes the formal position is secondary; what matters is real control over the state apparatus. In this sense, the preservation of power for Vučić is the primary objective, regardless of the office he holds.
It is precisely here that the militarization of society and the state acquires political meaning. The invention of the external enemy and the construction of the narrative of strategic encirclement serve as two parallel vectors: one is used to exert pressure and control over internal opposition, while the other keeps the public mobilized and fearful. These two mechanisms function in a complementary manner, and whenever one weakens, the other is activated to balance and protect the regime’s interests.
That the preservation of Vucis’s regime is also institutionally supported by Russia is evidenced by the December 2021 agreement, according to which Moscow commits to assisting Serbia against so-called “color revolutions” and external interventions. This agreement makes it clear that militarization and internal repression are not merely choices of Belgrade, but part of a broader authoritarian security architecture.
Militarization of Serbia and Russia’s geopolitics within the security architecture
The analysis shows that the militarization of Serbia and Russia’s diplomatic support are not random or reactive actions, but part of a coordinated strategy with three main objectives.
First, the fundamental goal is the preservation of Aleksandar Vucic’s regime. The current regime no longer enjoys sufficient political and societal support through democratic mechanisms. For this reason, power increasingly relies on force, fear, and propaganda. The militarization of the state and society, together with the construction of a narrative of encirclement and permanent crisis, serve as tools for neutralizing internal opposition and maintaining political control.
Second, the preservation of Vucic’s regime enables the preservation of Russia’s current influence in Serbia. In the absence of an alternative political actor equally strong and reliable for Moscow, Vučić remains the key actor for guaranteeing Russian interests in Belgrade. Any uncontrolled change of power would endanger this influence; therefore, the stability of the current regime is a direct Russian strategic interest.
Third, this situation creates conditions for the expansion of Russian–Serbian influence in the Balkans. A militarized Serbia serves as an instrument of regional pressure and as a negotiating tool in Russia’s relations with the United States and the West. By keeping the Western Balkans unstable and potentially escalatory, Moscow retains the ability to impose its interests at global negotiation tables.
In this context, the militarization of Serbia is not only an internal mechanism for political survival, but also a strategic component of Russia’s authoritarian security architecture. In the event of a deterioration of geopolitical circumstances or a global escalation, Russia has at its disposal a ready and controllable actor in the Balkans, turning Serbia into an active lever of regional influence and destabilization. Thus, peace and instability are becoming strategic factors, while the sidelining of the European Union in this process is part of the strategy. This does not place the region directly on the brink of war, but in a state of sustained tension in which peace is always under negotiation.
© 2026 Argumentum
