Dr. Ioannis Armakolas*
North Macedonia is going to general elections on July 15. Zoran Zaev’s centre-left SDSM and Hristijan Mickoski’s right-wing VMRO-DPMNE are set to compete for forming the next government. The election campaign focused on the economy, the rule of law and EU membership. Among the topics of discussion was also the Prespa Agreement, which settled the long-standing ‘name dispute’ with Greece. Zoran Zaev’s SDSM champions the full implementation of the agreement; while the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE, which still does not use the country’s new name, has declared that – in some magical way, obviously – it would not repeal the agreement, while at the same time not be bound by the new name and the agreement’s other provisions.
SDSM has lost the advantage it had held after it came to power in 2017. It courageously reached settlements of disputes with Greece and Bulgaria, unblocked the EU accession process and achieved membership in NATO. But in the domestic front, reforms have not been sufficiently implemented, the party’s left-wing agenda has not been realised, and the strengthening of the rule of law and the fight against corruption remain a serious challenge. The Zaev government is still not convincing enough in its claims to confront the entanglement of politics and business interests; for many it remains merely the less damaging option, not a truly inspiring political force. Having said that, VMRO-DPMNE remains totally un-reformed and still tainted by its former leader Nikola Gruevski’s premiership, who brought the country to the edge of a precipice through a rule marked by corruption, authoritarianism and nationalism.
Most credible polls give a marginal lead to the SDSM coalition, but with the turnout unknown, estimates are risky. It is possible that the two forces will again be close to the 50 seats with a marginal difference between them, as well as that VMRO-DPMNE may end up in the first place.
Polls suggest that the Albanian DUI may again hold the key to post-electoral developments. With a small break, the party has been in power for two decades. In 2017, under pressure from public opinion and Western governments, DUI opted to form a government with the then-ascending SDSM and not with the incumbent VMRO-DPMNE, which collected the most votes in the 2016 elections. But relations in the ruling coalition SDSM-DUI are not in the best shape and Zaev would prefer to rule in the future with other Albanian parties, and not DUI. The latter is after all widely accused of corruption and incompetence. Part and parcel of SDSM’s strategy, in addition to electoral calculations, has been the formation of a pre-electoral coalition with the smaller Albanian party BESA; the shrewdness of this choice, however, remains to be confirmed at the ballot box. Importantly, Zaev remains a highly popular politician among Albanians in the country.
In the highly probable scenario where DUI will remain strong, by for example retaining its ten MPs in the new assembly, it will very likely preserve its role as kingmaker. The DUI leadership has set the goal of electing an Albanian Prime Minister for the first time in the country’s history. But the main ethnic Macedonian parties reject this. Moreover, for DUI, the full implementation of the agreements with Greece and Bulgaria remains a “red line”, so that North Macedonia’s integration into Western institutions continues unimpeded. A fierce battle for the formation of the next government is therefore expected. DUI has repeatedly proved that it is a tough negotiator and that it will do everything in its power to remain in government.
For Greece, the day after will be of particular interest, either because of the difficulty in forming a government, or, mainly, if VMRO-DPMNE returns to power. Greece insists on the unimpeded implementation of the Prespa Agreement. But a VMRO-DPMNE government will make implementation more difficult. Especially in relation to the universal use of the new name Northern Macedonia, which Zoran Zaev fully promotes, but is denied by VMRO-DPMNE. Similarly, Athens may soon “discover” that a less friendly government in Skopje can engage in “soft” undermining of the agreement, especially in key for Greece issues of identity and national narratives. It is clear that both for Greece and the European Union policies in the region a strong Zaev government is a much more favourable option. What remains then to be analysed and understood is why Athens did not find ways to extend even indirect support to this strongly pro-European and friendly to Greece political option. (Revised article published in To Vima on July 12, 2020)
* Dr. Ioannis Armakolas is Assistant Professor, Department of Balkan, Slavic & Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki Head, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP
