Greece in the Balkans: Multiple Possibilities, Low Performance

Greece continues to ‘punch below its weight’ compared to both its potential and the expectations of its Balkan neighbors. Greek governments have systematically overestimated the role of Greece in the past thirty years believing that its membership in international organizations, its long democratic tradition and its economic power translate automatically to influence in the region. That was a cardinal mistake, as these advantages, which were enormous during the 90s due to the severe lag of the former communist states, required a systematic policy and the appropriate diplomatic culture in order to be translated into a substantive role. On the contrary, Greece by following zero sum strategies, phobic syndromes and getting carried away by the public opinion and populist media, managed to alienate the majority of the Balkan states and at the same time hamper its own role. Greece effectively became part of the Balkan problem rather than part of the solution. The situation only partially changed after the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit and the European perspective of the region, as the fearful approach to bilateral disputes continued to undermine Greece’s role.

The Prespa Agreement, for the first time since 2003, brought Greece back to the centre of Balkan developments in a constructive way. The agreement became a point of reference for Western and Balkan governments, which expected that Greece would confidently return to the region in a leading role. However, Athens did not prove ready for this, despite the proclamations to the contrary on the part of its political leaders. In that respect, with the exception of isolated cases of energetic diplomacy, as in the recent successful push for the start of EU accession negotiations of North Macedonia and Albania, Athens is still unable to find its own confident diplomatic pace.

To give but a few examples: The Prespa Agreement includes an elaborate framework for a positive agenda of promoting the close inter-connection between North Macedonia and Greece. In addition, for the first time in many years, a governing elite in Skopje genuinely aspires to a strategic engagement with Greece. Yet, the record of the implementation of the agreement to date shows that Greece is not ready for such a partnership.

Likewise, despite the excellent relations with Sofia and the accomplishment of the Prespa Agreement, Athens is still not pondering ways to mediate in the crisis between Bulgaria and North Macedonia, which threatens to put major obstacles to the European perspective of the latter. Athens is equally absent from all debates surrounding a potential agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, despite the fact that the scenario of a land swap that is being explored will have negative consequences for Greece. Meanwhile, Athens has failed to forge trust with the Albanian populations and their political elites. In spite of the multilevel economic and social interconnection with Albania, politico-diplomatic relations remain problematic.

Greece’s contribution to the plans for the political, economic and business prospects of the region, as reflected in the works of the Berlin Process, is also sluggish. Athens has been absent from the process during the crucial first four years, but even more recently its contribution to its schemes and planning remains minimal. Characteristically, Greece did not strive to assume this year’s co-chair, despite Berlin reportedly being favourable to the prospect that would have been the tailpiece of the reconciliation between Athens and Skopje. As such, an opportunity to promote Greek priorities in the context of the Western Balkans’ EU accession process was lost, along with the opportunity to cover lost ground from Greece’s prior absence.

This reveals a deeper problem with Greek foreign policy. Absorbed with the task of tackling the Turkish problem, Athens is making decisive diplomatic moves only where Ankara is involved or when there is potential room for an increase of Turkish influence. In the Western Balkans, where Turkey is working systematically but without the dynamic moves which it undertakes elsewhere, Greece is unable to act effectively. The realities of the two states differ, however. Turkey has the luxury of participating in geopolitical games, especially if the region’s European perspective dims. For Greece, however, it is of vital importance that the Balkans escape the cycle of instability and anaemic development which is the prevailing trend in the rest of Greece’s neighbouring regions. For Greece, it is crucial that the Balkans are driven decisively down the path of democracy, development and rule of law.

All in all, Greece has to clarify its goals and priorities. Greek governments insist of their commitment to the process of the Europeanization of the Balkans, but one may sometimes wonder if this is merely lip service. If Athens desires to attract the entire Balkans away from geopolitical peril and to secure them in the European zone of stability much more than mere monitoring of regional developments and intervention solely when narrowly defined Greek interests are at stake is needed. A political vision and the creation of a set of initiatives for fundamental reform of the politics, economics and mindset of the region will be required.