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By Philip Acey*
The U.S. “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela on January 3rd should not be interpreted narrowly as a regime change, counter-narcotics operation, or a seizure of the country’s oil industry. While the capture of Nicolás Maduro and his wife was the most visible outcome, the operation’s true significance lies in its implications for regional order and global power competition.
Venezuela was the lynchpin of a broader network of adversarial influence in the Western Hemisphere, connecting Cuba, Nicaragua, Iran, criminal trafficking networks, and competing powers China and Russia. Maduro’s removal and the establishment of a U.S.-led transitional administration signify a structural realignment in the geopolitical landscape of the Americas, with implications that extend far beyond the region.
As President Trump stated in his January 3rd press conference, “We are reasserting American power in a very different way.” That reassertion is less about Venezuela itself than about reshaping the strategic environment under which competitors and adversaries operate in the Western Hemisphere.
Rapid Collapse of the Venezuelan Military: Propaganda vs. Reality
The rapid collapse of Venezuelan military resistance exposed the regime’s long-standing disconnect between propaganda and reality. Despite years of fiery rhetoric about sovereignty and resistance to ‘U.S. imperialism,’ Venezuelan forces were quickly overwhelmed and neutralized with minimal resistance and no American deaths.
Maduro’s declaration of a “state of external disturbance” and the mobilization of its military and alleged 4.5 million members of the Bolivarian Militia of Venezuela did not materialize at the critical moment. It illustrated how propaganda often collapses when confronted with real, credible, and capable force.
From an analytical standpoint, however, the significance of this collapse lies less in the speed of military defeat than in what it enabled. The removal of Venezuela as a permissive environment for anti-U.S. activity alters the regional security architecture and constrains the operational freedom of adversarial actors.
“America First” as Strategic Consolidation
The Venezuela operation further clarifies the meaning of “America First,” a concept frequently mischaracterized as isolationist. Rather than a withdrawal from global affairs, it reflects a consolidation of U.S. power in priority regions – which includes the Western Hemisphere.
As Trump articulated, “We want America to be surrounded by good neighbours.” In this context, Venezuela had become the opposite: a destabilizing actor threatening U.S. homeland security through drugs, illegal migration, and foreign adversarial presence. When viewed through this lens, the Venezuela operation represents a realist effort to restore Area Denial and strategic depth rather than an ideologically-motivated intervention.
Oil is a Supporting – not Central – Factor of U.S. Intervention
U.S. energy considerations reinforce – but do not drive – the strategic logic of the operation. Venezuela’s oil reserves, long mismanaged after its nationalization and forcing out of most American oil companies, now represent an opportunity that could stabilize regional energy supply and weaken adversarial economies – particularly Iran.
Trump’s emphasis on rebuilding the country’s energy infrastructure and getting “oil flowing” highlights the economic dimension of control to push oil prices down. Eventual increases in Venezuelan oil production under U.S. oversight could pressure Iran, reshape global pricing, and weaken de-dollarization efforts by trading Venezuelan oil in USD. Nevertheless, oil functions as a force multiplier, not a primary cause to intervene in Venezuela. The strategic objective remains the reconfiguration of regional power dynamics rather than resource extraction.
Regional Shockwaves and Realignment of the Western Hemisphere
The immediate impact of the Venezuela operation is regional. For years, Venezuela served as a political, economic, and logistical hub for rival governments and adversarial movements across the Western Hemisphere. Its temporary administration by the U.S., leading toward a pro-U.S. government, accelerates a broader hemispheric realignment already underway.
Cuba is the most exposed. Venezuela served as Cuba’s primary supplier of subsidized oil, sustaining the Díaz-Canel regime despite chronic economic failure. With U.S. companies poised to control Venezuelan oil production, that lifeline is likely to be severed, exacerbating an already fraught economic crisis and placing further pressure on the revolutionary regime to reform or capitulate. Secretary of State Marco Rubio underscored this point by describing Cuba as “in total collapse,” a “failing nation,” and that those in the Cuban government should be “concerned.”
The Cuban president’s response to the Venezuela operation – “Homeland or Death, We Shall Overcome!” – echoed revolutionary slogans. These slogans have been repeated for decades as the Cuban people continue to suffer from food insecurity, frequent power outages, and a recent outbreak of Chikungunya which is straining the nation’s hospitals. These slogans also echo the rhetoric of Maduro used before his capture – “We must be ready to defend every inch of this blessed land from imperialist threat or aggression, regardless of its origin. The homeland is sacred, the homeland must be respected.” Slogans do not translate into real defence of a regime – as in the case of January 3, 2026 attests – and the Díaz-Canel regime is fully aware that it is increasingly isolated and vulnerable.
Nicaragua similarly loses a critical ally. The Venezuelan government had supplied weapons, political backing, and safe haven to the Sandinistas against U.S. interests. With a new administration, that supply network will very likely now end. Ortega had even offered to send Sandinista fighters to Venezuela to prevent any counter-revolution following the July 2024 elections. The likely termination of this relationship increases Nicaragua’s isolation and raises the cost of its continued anti-American activities.
Colombia occupies a more complex position. Venezuela had long served as a permissive environment for drug traffickers and armed groups hostile to U.S. counter-narcotics objectives. Its removal increases pressure on the Colombian government to take decisive action against drug trafficking, particularly as the country approaches a pivotal election in May 2026. President Gustavo Petro – another fiery anti-Trump figure – is constitutionally barred from running again, which opens up the country to the possibility of an ideological change in government in the coming months. It is noteworthy that U.S. pressure in 2025 to cut off aid already helped sway electorates in Argentina and Honduras to elect pro-U.S. candidates.
Taken together, these shifts contrast sharply with Cold War-era dynamics. Whereas much of Latin America once fell within competing ideological blocs, by 2025 the overwhelming majority of governments in the region are aligned with
U.S. interests. For example, during periods of the Cold War, Cuba, Grenada, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Guyana, Suriname, and Chile – were governed by regimes aligned with the Soviet Union. As of 2025, all of the above except Cuba and Nicaragua have pro-U.S. governments.
In 2025, pro-U.S. governments came to power or were re-elected in Chile, Honduras, and Ecuador; mid-term elections heavily favoured President Milei’s pro-U.S. party in Argentina, and a pro-U.S. government could potentially be elected in Peru in April 2026. The end of the Maduro regime accelerates this good-neighbourly transformation and further constrains adversarial freedom of action in the Western Hemisphere for competitors or adversaries such as Iran, China, and Russia.
Messages to China and Russia
Beyond the region, the Venezuela operation sends unmistakable signals to China and Russia regarding the limits of their influence in Latin America. While Trump emphasized that foreign countries can still buy Venezuelan oil, China would need to do it under American oversight, stripping it of the leverage it once held through loan-for-oil arrangements.
In response to this heightened supply uncertainty and an effort to mitigate U.S. leverage, China is likely to deepen its reliance on alternative suppliers – including Russia, Kazakhstan, and Gulf countries – while U.S. control over Western Hemisphere energy flows is reinforced. In this context, the strategic significance of the Panama Canal for China is also likely to diminish, another objective of the Trump administration. Trump’s assertion that, “We have much greater dominance (in the Western Hemisphere) right now,” reflects this strategic objective and reality.
For Russia, the consequences are also immediate. Venezuela was not only a major purchaser of Russian arms but also a symbolic ally in Moscow’s challenge to U.S. influence in Latin America, as well as a vocal proponent of multipolarity and de-dollarization. Its loss reduces Russia’s arms market and leaves it with little recourse beyond rhetorical condemnation. The Russian Foreign Ministry’s complaint that “[U.S.] ideologized hostility has prevailed over pragmatism” misreads the situation. The Venezuela operation was driven by pragmatic calculations of power, security, and influence – not ideology.
The broader implication is clear: political and military power projection – especially in the Western Hemisphere – remains overwhelmingly American with less space for China and Russia to manoeuvre.
Iran Loses Foothold in Latin America
Arguably, the most strategic consequence of the Venezuela operation is its impact on Iran. For more than two decades, Venezuela has served as Iran’s primary gateway into Latin America. Under then-President Hugo Chávez, Iran was invited into the region, forging a close alliance with then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
This partnership granted Iran access to Venezuelan territory. From Venezuela, Iranian and Hezbollah networks expanded throughout Central and South America, facilitating drug trafficking, money laundering, and covert operations aimed at undermining U.S. interests. The presence of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hezbollah in Venezuela was foundational to Iran’s regional strategy to raise funds, circumvent international sanctions, and plan operations in various parts of the globe.
The removal of Maduro dismantles this architecture. Venezuela will likely no longer function as a safe haven for Iranian operatives or its proxy organizations like Hezbollah. This sharply constrains Iran’s ability to traffic drugs, move personnel, and project influence in the region. It now faces the challenge of relocation at a time when U.S.- friendly governments dominate most of the region, making it easier for the United States to monitor and thwart Iranian activities.
Observe how the region has shifted in favour of U.S. interests at the expense of Iranian interests since the early 2000s. In 2007, then-President Ahmadinejad visited Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Bolivia – all then governed by leaders opposed to the United States. Today, and largely only since 2025, all except Nicaragua are led by U.S.-friendly governments. Maduro’s removal deprives Iran of its most important regional ally and is likely to erode its footprint in Latin America.
The implications also extend to global finance. Both Chávez and Maduro were vocal advocates of de-dollarization, aligning closely with Iran’s efforts to weaken the dominance of the U.S. dollar in global trade. With a U.S.-friendly transition underway in Venezuela, this further isolates Iran and weakens alternative financial mechanisms.
Strategically, the Venezuela operation reinforces its Area Denial strategy consistent with the Monroe Doctrine. Iran, its proxies, and its illicit networks are increasingly being systematically excluded from the Western Hemisphere, limiting Iran’s global manoeuvrability at a critical moment, facing growing economic and political pressures at home.
Venezuela as a Reflection Point for Allies and Adversaries
The U.S. operation in Venezuela was not solely about Maduro, drug trafficking or oil. It was a multi-pronged strategy designed to reshape the regional and global strategic environment: constraining adversaries, consolidating U.S. influence and security in the Western Hemisphere, and signaling continued American dominance.
As Secretary of State Rubio noted, this was the arrest of “two indicted fugitives,” but its consequences extend far beyond. Maduro’s collapse accelerates hemispheric realignment, constrains China and Russia, and delivers a setback to Iran’s global strategy.
In that regard, the Venezuela operation represents the latest focal point for reflection among both allies and adversaries. “America First” is not a withdrawal from international engagement – it is reconfiguring how it is done in accordance with U.S. interests in a time of growing shifts and systemic challenges. Its reverberations will continue to be felt well beyond Venezuela and for years to come.
Philip Acey is a PhD candidate from Canada and an independent political researcher and analyst who has worked for over a decade across Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America, visiting more than 50 countries. His research has been used worldwide to advise the UN Security Council, UN agencies, diplomats, and humanitarian organizations. Connect with him on X: @Philipfficial
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