Original article by Dragan Sormaz for The Geopost
Russia in the Western Balkans has a destabilizing potential that primarily manifests through its influence on far-right political circles connected to the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), through which it aims to destabilize the region and obstruct its integration into the EU and NATO. In these efforts, Russia tries to deepen interethnic divisions and provoke incidents that could push the region to the brink of armed conflict, bringing it back to the situation of the 1990s.
Due to the lack of a Serbian political factor and the SOC, Moscow’s influence is currently lowest in Albania. The Orthodox Church in Albania is connected to the Greek Orthodox world, which serves as the strongest proof that the Russian Church is actually an extension of Moscow’s criminal regime and is directly involved in destabilizing the region! Official Tirana is a strongly pro-Western country — a NATO member since 2009 and a candidate for EU membership. Albania has recently been advancing rapidly toward the EU and has surpassed Serbia in the negotiation process. What Serbia achieved in 7 years, Albania accomplished in just 7 months! The political, economic, and social space for Russian infiltration is very narrow. Nevertheless, there have been some Russian efforts through propaganda and disinformation operations to exert influence, but so far these have been extremely limited. A few years ago, Albania was the target of a cyberattack originating from Iranian territory, following Albania’s support for Ukraine and backing of EU decisions to impose sanctions on Russia. But this is the only thing Moscow has managed to do so far. Albania is the best example in Southeastern Europe that shows how important it is to distance oneself from Moscow if one desires peace, freedom, and economic progress… in fact, it is an even better example than Croatia!
One of Russia’s key levers of power in the region is the issue of Kosovo’s status, through which Moscow exerts significant influence in Serbia. Russia does not recognize Kosovo’s independence and uses its position on the UN Security Council to block international recognition. In Kosovo, Russia does not have significant direct influence in society but holds strong political sway through its support of Serbia and extremist Serbian groups in Kosovo. Russia uses the tensions between Belgrade and Pristina as a tool to pressure the West and divert attention from Ukraine. It supports extremist and right-wing Serbian narratives in northern Kosovo and may also be involved in possible intelligence activities.
Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, propaganda intensity has increased, with similar patterns:
- That NATO, the EU, or the collective West is provoking conflict in Kosovo;
- That the Albanian majority supports a ‘pogrom’ against the Serbian population;
- That attacks against Serbs always go unpunished;
- And that the ultimate goal is the deployment of NATO troops throughout the Balkans, essentially the “occupation” of Serbian territory!
Parallels are drawn between the “threats” to Serbs in Kosovo and to Russians in Donbas, with calls for “denazification.”
The issue of Russian influence over the group led by Milan Radoičić, who carried out the terrorist attack in Banjska in September 2023, remains particularly open. According to my information, aside from an advisory role, Russia did not directly participate in this action and the entire plan was orchestrated by Aleksandar Vučić — but this is something for the court in Pristina to determine!
Russian influence is noticeably more present in North Macedonia, but still limited thanks to the country’s NATO membership (since 2020) and its orientation toward EU integration. Moscow opposed the Prespa Agreement with Greece and North Macedonia’s NATO membership.
Russia attempted to influence Skopje through pro-Russian political parties and far-right groups, especially during the crisis over the country’s name change. Investigative journalists have published detailed articles on the attempted coup in Macedonia on April 27, 2019, when Zoran Zaev was nearly assassinated, for which Macedonian security services blamed Russian and Serbian intelligence. Reports from the Macedonian security service also mention the journalist from the newspaper Politika, Miroslav Lazanski, who was later appointed Serbia’s ambassador to Moscow.
To this end, a strong propaganda campaign was employed using Russian narratives through local media, particularly online and on social media. Despite some successes and the return to power of the pro-Russian VMRO-DPMNE party, today the country has significantly increased its resistance to Russian influence, mainly thanks to its integration into NATO security structures. Additionally, the current government in Skopje is well aware that it is the Kremlin itself that is reinforcing the Bulgarian narrative about the position of the Bulgarian minority in North Macedonia.
Among Albanians, Russia finds no suitable ground for its activities, but it is actively trying to destabilize their relationships with the Euro-Atlantic world! How successful it is and how much influence it has over Serbs will be addressed in my next article.
