By Zlatko Kramarić*|ARGUMENTUM
The concepts of banal nationalism and banal antifascism appear today in Croatian, but also broader European political space as two almost symmetrical phenomena: discursive practices that cease to be serious political and moral positions and instead become ritualised, automatic, unreflective gestures. They reproduce identity habits rather than articulate considered values.
1. Banal Nationalism: From Billig to Post-Socialist Transformations
In his classic study Banal Nationalism (1995), Michael Billig showed how nations are reproduced through everyday, almost invisible signals — flags, phrases, protocols, sports rituals, television narratives. Nationalism is not merely a time bomb that explodes in crises; it is primarily a quiet, banal reminder of belonging, a mnemonic structure operating in the background.
In post-socialist societies, the concept acquired an additional layer: nationalisms were not banal only in the sense of weak/quiet signals, but became self-explanatory. Party and media rituals of the 1990s began to reproduce themselves without any critical distance. Thus emerged a nationalism that requires no arguments — because it is convinced it is always already right. Its banality is not a lack of strength, but a lack of reflection.
2. Banal Antifascism: Billig in Reverse
Today we witness a phenomenon that can be described as banal antifascism: a discourse invoking the moral imperative of fighting fascism, while reducing that imperative to a phrase, a slogan, a symbolic performance. Banal antifascism does not require historical knowledge, philosophical understanding of totalitarianism, nor political analysis of contemporary extremism — it suffices to utter the word “antifascism” as an identity marker.
In this sense, banal antifascism no longer reacts to real manifestations of fascism or authoritarianism, but serves as a social ritual of affirming one’s own moral superiority. To be an “antifascist” becomes a form without content; a sense of belonging rather than a political programme.
An example is seen in a series of protests (including those in Croatia), where antifascism functions as an umbrella term for various political frustrations — economic, identity-related, symbolic. Instead of analysis, an automatism appears: everything that annoys me = fascism; any resistance to my position = a threat to freedom.
3. The Shared Structure of Banalisation
Although banal nationalism and banal antifascism sit at opposite ideological poles, they share several elements:
a) Ritualisation
Both replace political thought with political habit. Gesture replaces argument, belonging replaces understanding of history and context.
b) Moral Reductionism
In both cases, “we” are good because we are “us”, “they” are bad because they are “them”. Complex political processes are reduced to good vs. evil. In banal nationalism this means “ours” vs. “theirs”, in banal antifascism “antifascists” vs. “fascists”.
c) Obscuring Real Problems
Both serve as identity screens masking real socio-economic or political issues: corruption, poverty, demographics, institutional weaknesses, political instrumentalisation of the past.
4. The Croatian Context: Dual Instrumentalisation of the Past
In Croatia, the tension between these two discourses is particularly strong because both pretend to monopolise the moral legitimacy of the state.
Banal nationalism abuses the Homeland War and the symbolic capital of sacrifice.
Banal antifascism abuses the antifascist tradition and the legacy of the WWII resistance.
Both narratives often operate as closed systems of truth, unable to recognise their own shadows: nationalism does not see its own excesses, antifascism does not see its own historical errors. This often produces hysteria: instead of dialogue — labels; instead of politics — moralising.
5. The European Context
The development is similar across Europe: fatigue with liberal democracy and frustration over economic inequalities open the door to both banalisation processes.
In Western societies, “antifascism” is often used to suppress undesirable opinions within the dominant culture of political correctness.
In Eastern societies, “nationalism” is used to delegitimise liberal or pluralist initiatives.
The result is political theatre, not political debate.
6. Why Is This Banalisation Dangerous?
a) It erases the distinction between real fascism and political disagreement
If everything is fascism, then nothing is (S. Žižek). Meanwhile, real fascist tendencies (authoritarianism, cult of the leader, violence, dehumanisation of opponents) pass unnoticed. Tzvetan Todorov warned that moral values, once reduced to ritual, lose their democratic force.
b) It empties the meaning of national belonging
If everything is nationalism, then patriotism loses its positive meanings — responsibility, common good, preservation of institutions.
c) It divides society into moral camps
Banalisation creates a sense of a struggle “to the end”, without compromise. Democracy withers in such an atmosphere.
7. Concluding Perspective: The Need for “Serious” Nationalism and “Serious” Antifascism
The antidote to banalisation is not mutual cancellation, but rehumanisation.
Serious nationalism means embracing history, language, identity, and heritage — but also responsibility toward the Other.
Serious antifascism means defending democracy, pluralism, minority rights, and the rule of law — not declaratively, but substantively.
Banal nationalism and banal antifascism are reactions to feelings of political powerlessness. Serious nationalism and serious antifascism are attempts at political emancipation.
Only when political culture moves from automatic reaction to political reflection can we speak of a mature democratic society, where symbols do not serve as weapons but as bridges.
*Zlatko Kramarić is a Croatian publicist, author, and diplomat, currently serving as Ambassador to Albania. Formerly a university professor and politician, he is known for his work in literature, cultural studies, and regional history.
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