By Janusz Bugajski
Politicians in Kosova have to put aside their partisan and legalistic disputes for the good of the nation and the survival of the state. With talks restarted between Kosova and Serbia under EU auspices it is important to examine the strengths and weaknesses of the two protagonists and how Prishtina needs to act to achieve its objectives.
Kosovar Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti has claimed that the meeting with Serbian President Aleksander Vucic in Brussels on July 16initiated the drafting of a “final agreement” between Kosova and Serbia. This may be wishful thinking for two main reasons – Belgrade’s determination not to finalize the talks and Kosova’s persistent political divisions.
Kosova’s political leadership is fractured at a time when it urgently needs unity. President Hashim Thaci has been sidelined and is poised to resign because of Hague indictments over alleged war crimes.The main opposition leader Albin Kurti is attacking Hoti for his alleged lack of legitimacy, transparency, and unpreparedness for the talks. And Ramush Haradinaj and Fatmir Limaj, leaders of parties in the ruling coalition, claim they were not consulted in the appointment of Skender Hyseni’s as state coordinator for dialogue with Serbia.
Hyseni’s role remains unclear, whether as the coordinator of a technical dialogue or the negotiator of a final agreement. The lack of political consensus around the talks and over Hyseni’s role is a major gift for Belgrade. Hoticalledfor a parliamentary session about the Brussels talks, but this was not only boycotted by opposition party leaders but also by coalition partners. In these hostile conditions, one wonders how long the government with a narrow majority in parliament will actually survive.
The threat of government collapse and a further postponement of talks benefitsVucic who wants to restrict the negotiations to endless technical details. The strategy is intended to demonstrate that Kosovais a failed state, badly governed by squabbling politicians, a hub for organized crime, led by war criminals who are victimizing Serbs, and a source of regional instability. By arguing that Kosova is not a credible state, Belgradewantsthe EU to abandon its conditionality in recognizing Prishtina and focus onsupportingSerbia.
Belgrade’s ultimate objective is for Kosova to be so embroiled in internal conflict that the state ceases to function and the economy collapses. If Belgrade cannot regain Kosova then it wants to make certain that the country does not survive and will again raise the specter of a division of territory between Serbia and Albania as the only solution.
Confusion over the content of the EU talks alsohelpsBelgrade. Following the July 16 meeting, Miroslav Lajcak, the EU Special Representative, stated that both leaders agreed to work intensively at expert level.Hoti dismissed the notion that this simply meant a continuation of a technical dialogue but would focus on mutual recognition. Vuciccontradicted Hoti’s statementthat a final agreement is being drafted by the two capitals.
EU mediation efforts have rested on the assumption that Serbia will normalize relations with Kosova in exchange for EU accession. The problem is that Belgrade does not trust Brussels in delivering on such promises. Although Vucic publicly supports Serbia’s EU entry, it remains unclear whether he really want Serbia to join an organization that requires political accountability and economic transparency. Brusselsis unlikely to approve the entry of a state where one party has a monopoly and where the rule of law is violated and the media stifled.
Unless the current Kosova-Serbia negotiations have a clear purpose and a deadline then they will continue to keep the region in a limbo.One solution would be an EU ultimatumthat either Serbia recognizes Kosova as an independent stateor EU-Serbia accession talkswill be suspendedwhile relations with Kosovawill develop through visa liberalization and closer association. Unfortunately, Brussels lacks the courage to take such bold steps.
The frustrating fact is that consensus does exist across the political spectrum in Kosova that any final agreement with Serbia must involve mutual recognition. Unfortunately, there is a lack of trust and leadership in Prishtina to make sure that this message is loudly and consistently heard on both sides of the Atlantic. And internal political conflicts help Belgrade by creating the impression that Kosova’s leaders are divided on theirobjectives. To achieve concrete goals one needs both strategy and unity./DITA
