By Dr. Gurakuq Kuçi
Senior Researcher at the Institute for Hybrid Warfare Studies “OCTOPUS”
Serbia’s political scene is entering a new phase, reminiscent of a return to the 1990s, when the legacy of Milošević and Šešelj embodied a model of authoritarian power, based on absolute control of the state and security structures. Today, the duo Tomislav Nikolić – Aleksandar Vučić re-emerges as a potential political axis, reviving not only the ghosts of the past but also creating concrete risks for the future of democracy in Serbia and for regional stability.
According to Russian media, Vučić is considering the idea of bringing Nikolić back into the spotlight as president, while taking for himself the role of prime minister. This configuration is a direct imitation of the Putin–Medvedev model in Russia: a formal president who preserves the institutional facade, while real power rests with the prime minister, who controls the government, security, police, finances, etc. In this scenario, Vučić not only strengthens his personal power but also eliminates any internal balance, transforming Serbia into an entirely personalist system.
Nikolić’s return is not coincidental. For years he has held the position of chairman of the National Council for Cooperation with Russia and China, serving as an institutional hub for Belgrade’s eastern orientation. His recent participation in the military parade in China, alongside Vučić, was a clear signal of strategic positioning: Serbia is aligning itself ever more openly with the Moscow–Beijing axis. This means that every internal political maneuver also carries an external geopolitical dimension.
Yet the strongest sign of authoritarianism does not stem from political maneuvers but from the capture of security structures. The dismissal of the commander of the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit, Spasoje Vulević, simply because he was not under Vučić’s “absolute control,” is the prelude to a broader process: the total loyalization of the security services. This is a classic mechanism of authoritarian consolidation, the elimination of any alternative centers of armed power that could operate outside the leader’s control. With this step, Vučić is preparing the ground for stronger repression against the opposition, the media, and civil society.
The consequences are clear. Inside Serbia, democracy is reduced to an electoral theater without real competition, where elections serve only for formal legitimacy. Outside its borders, neighbors and international partners face a more authoritarian Serbia, less predictable and more open to hybrid operations. For Kosovo, this implies intensification of political and security interference; for Bosnia and Montenegro, increased internal pressure toward destabilization; for the EU and the U.S., an unreliable partner who maintains the course of integration only rhetorically.
At its core, the return of Nikolić as president and Vučić’s move to prime minister is much more than a political maneuver: it is the signal of Serbia’s transformation into a personalist regime similar to Putin’s, with direct consequences for the region. For the international community, this is a clear alarm, either intervene with firm conditions and real pressure on Belgrade, or prepare for a new decade of authoritarianism and destabilization in the Balkans, where in any conflict the southeastern flank of NATO and all of Europe would be put at risk.
© 2025 Argumentum
