Dr. Gurakuq Kuçi
Professor at Universum College and external associate at ISLH “OCTOPUS”
The Western Balkans face a growing risk of asymmetric escalation, in which NATO’s deterrent power against conventional war is, paradoxically, creating space for “grey-zone” activities. Serbia’s demonstration of military strength—from the deployment of advanced air-defence capabilities and the “Pobednik 2026” exercises to new defence procurement packages—is less about direct confrontation with NATO and more about creating a “strategic umbrella.” This may foster a perception among local hardline actors that there is greater room for action below the threshold of an international response. Similar to the dynamics surrounding Banjska, the demonstration of military capabilities may be interpreted by state-linked structures as a signal of support for local confrontations below the threshold of conventional war.
These trends intersect with several other destabilising factors. Judicial developments in The Hague concerning former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army may fuel extremist narratives and historical revisionism. Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, followed by those in Serbia, create incentives for nationalist mobilisation, the instrumentalisation of security issues and, potentially, the manipulation of electoral processes. At the same time, Russian influence operations, underpinned by energy dependence, media and political networks, and forms of direct or indirect financing, may amplify local grievances and anti-Western narratives.
NATO’s vulnerability in this environment lies not in its military strength, but in the potential for delays in coordination and response. Grey-zone activities, ranging from cyber espionage targeting critical infrastructure to localised paramilitary incursions, can unfold within hours, while attribution and political coordination require more time. In the case of KFOR, a distinction must be made between NATO’s strategic decision-making and the mission’s operational authorities, but any ambiguity in interpreting the situation or determining the threshold for response may create space for gradual provocations.
Escalation in northern Kosovo or Bosnia and Herzegovina is more likely to produce a gradual weakening of the regional security architecture than open war. Deterrence requires clear red lines, defined procedures for KFOR’s response, monitoring of illicit transfers, and sanctions against entities financing destabilisation. The period leading up to the elections remains the critical window for making the costs and consequences clear before miscalculations occur.
© 2026 Argumentum
