By Gresa Hasa*
On October 15, during the second Inter-Governmental Conference, Albania officially opened Cluster 1 on fundamentals in its EU accession negotiations. A milestone that is argued to have been achieved after Albania’s EU integration process was decoupled from North Macedonia’s in September 2024, allowing the country to move forward independently. At the same time, the Italian navy ship ‘Libra’ departed from the port of Lampedusa on Monday, carrying 16 men—ten from Bangladesh and six from Egypt—who were intercepted at sea by Italian authorities after leaving Libya on their way to Italy. The ‘Libra’ docked at the Albanian port of Shëngjin on Wednesday, just a week after the official inauguration of the migrant detention centers, which have become a reality following the Italo-Albanian migration deal signed last year.
In the meantime, during a media briefing, Albania’s Prime Minister Edi Rama expressed his gratitude to Russian President Vladimir Putin, stating that Putin had “by [the] ruthless war of aggression [awaken] even the most skeptical and made them see the reality that the Western Balkans is needed for a stronger European Union as much as the European Union constellation is needed for the Western Balkans.” A master of propaganda and spin, Edi Rama knows when and where to be ironic, making such controversial statements in hopes of diverting attention. He is aware that many will suddenly focus on him ‘praising Putin’ instead of addressing the Italo-Albanian migration deal and the fact that Albania is officially jailing refugees on behalf of Italy and the EU.
The 2023 migration deal between Italy and Albania was signed based on Italy’s leverage to ‘accelerate Albania’s EU integration path’ and was endorsed by Brussels, which seems to have apparently viewed it as an ‘indirect condition.’ With EU countries like Germany and non-EU member the UK under a Labour government exploring a similar partnership with Albania, not only is the process of Albania’s EU negotiations and the opening of Cluster 1 called into question, but so is the entire region’s EU path.
It is important to note that just this July, Germany signed an EU lithium deal with Serbia, despite significant environmental protests in the country and the Aleksandar Vučić regime’s ongoing undermining of the rule of law, electoral irregularities, harassment of activists, lack of media freedom, and its warmongering, ultranationalist rhetoric towards neighboring Kosovo. This raises a critical point: while Vučić is a semi-autocratic leader, Germany and the EU have decided to prioritize their need for lithium instead. In a similar context, Edi Rama, likewise a semi-autocratic leader, is perceived by the EU as essential for addressing its migrant issue, particularly in light of the rise of extreme-right and populist parties in Europe that are shifting traditional political balances. Thus, the EU’s appeasement approach toward autocratic leaders in the region remains unchanged. But has its enlargement process truly been revived? It seems unlikely.
What does it signify that Albania opened Cluster 1 in the first place? To start with, while the opening of Cluster 1 is a positive step for Albania, this does not guarantee a rapid progress towards EU membership. Moreover, Albania has opened Cluster 1 amid significant political instability and in the context where the country de facto has regressed to a single-party-state after the last elections in May 2023. Currently the opposition is more fragmented and weakened than ever before, with its historical leader, Sali Berisha, under house arrest, and new political alternatives and civil society remaining divided, fragile, and without a clear perspective. However, while the opening of Cluster 1 may incentivize particularly civil society organizations to take action and demand greater accountability from the government, the prevailing sense of fatigue and the mass exodus of young people from the country leave little room for sustained engagement and advocacy.
Additionally, not only is the negotiation process slow and lengthy, but its initiation also does not guarantee a secure progression toward EU integration. The case of Turkey exemplifies how negotiations can stall despite initial progress. Turkey officially began its EU accession negotiations in 2005 after being granted candidate status in 1999. While several chapters of the accession process were opened, progress effectively stalled by 2016 due to various factors, including Turkey’s democratic backsliding and increasing authoritarianism under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Additionally, the EU leveraged a migration deal with Turkey, offering conditional support outside the framework of EU membership, which shifted its focus from accession negotiations to practical cooperation on migration management. In March 2020, the European Parliament voted to halt Turkey’s accession talks entirely under the reasoning of human rights violations.
In Albania’s case, Italy—an EU member state—has not only signed an EU migration deal with Albania but is also employing extraterritorial measures on the Albanian territory for the purpose of outsourcing migration control. This is unprecedented. Given these circumstances Italy is unlikely to be interested in seeing Albania join the EU when it would prefer to maintain Albania outside the Union, where it can offload responsibilities it would rather not manage. Therefore, the opening of Cluster 1 for Albania at the same time as the migrant detention centers in Shëngjin and Gjadër appears, in many ways, contradictory. However, Prime Minister Edi Rama has already capitalized on this as a success of his government, positioning himself and his leadership as the only solution and stabilizing force. But what about the real prospects for EU enlargement?
Furthermore, the EU’s track record with enlargement, as seen in the case of Turkey but also North Macedonia—where even North Macedonia, despite its commitment to the process, has been left behind—raises concerns about the future. This concern extends not only to Albania but to the entire Western Balkans region, which risks becoming a gray zone outside the EU, descending further into authoritarianism, with both people and hope migrating. The only way for the EU to demonstrate its commitment to integrating the Western Balkans into its union is to cease its appeasement of regional autocrats, avoid endorsing inhumane deals, especially promoted by far-right governments, such as the Italo-Albanian migration deal, and instead prioritize concrete enlargement strategies that support democratic and emancipatory movements in the region fighting against semi-authoritarianism and for a future in the EU together with the EU.
